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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

INTERVENTION TO PREVENT RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.

INTERNATIONAL

Law in its ideal state, has perhaps among its
cardinal duties the maintenance of religious freedom throughout the world. That this is not merely of theoretical import is evidenced by recent developments in Roumania and Mexico. The
former country apparently has countenanced religious persecution
by its mobs. The latter apparently has permitted this anachronism
by force of its own statutes and constitution. It therefore becomes
a real problem to determine to what extent civilized nations must
sit by and permit such conditions to continue or to what extent
are they charged with the duty to put forth efforts to secure universal religious liberty.
The struggle for religious freedom was the foundation for the
colonization of these United States and, as Chancellor Kent so
aptly says, "the very exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship may be considered as one of the absolute" rights
of individuals recognized in our American Constitution, and
secured to them by law. Civil and religious liberty generally go
hand and hand and the separation of either of them, for any length
of time, will terminate the existence of the other." 1
The situation in Mexico is unique in that the vast majority of
the inhabitants of that country profess the faith which is being
persecuted. Mr. William D. Guthrie, president of the New York
City Bar Association has in a recently published opinion 2 explained the existing situation in Mexico with great clarity. While
Mr. Guthrie is opposed to intervention by the United States in
Mexico, as a matter of policy, he recognizes the existence of the
religious persecution and oppression and expounds the situation in
his learned opinion.
With the overthrow of the government in Mexico in 1917 a
new Constitution was foisted upon the peoples of that country.
It is assumed that this Constitution was legally adopted. Among
the Articles in this Constitution which so flagrantly violate the
'Kent-Commentaries part IV *p. 261.
2

New York Times, Dec. 12, 1926.
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recognized universal rights of the Roman Catholic Church, is
Article 130, which provides:
"The law recognizes no juridical personality in religious
institutions known as churches."
The true significance and deliberate intent of this Act is to
deny the right to all churches of court procedure and lawful redress
of any wrong committed against them irrespective of cause. This
Act denies the churches of Mexico the right to protection against
any violation of rights by government officials, and denies the right
to petition. Thus, when the Roman Catholic hierarchy respectfully presented, upon the admonition of President Calles, a petition
to the Mexican Congress seeking redress for grievances and a
protection against such violation of church rights in protesting
against the confiscation of church property, this petition was tabled
and wholly ignored, either upon the premise set forth in the above
section or upon another section, Article XXXVII which provides
that citizenship shall be lost
"subdivision 3: by compromising themselves in any way
before ministers of any religious creed or before any other
person not to observe the present Constitution or the laws
arising thereunder."
This denial to the Roman Catholic Church of juristic personality violates accepted international law among all civilized nations
under the principles of universal acceptance. The Supreme Court
of the United States, in the case of Ponce v. Roman Catholic
Church, 3 Chief Justice Fuller, voicing the unanimous opinion of
the Court, said:
"The corporate existence of the Roman Catholic
Church, as well as the position occupied by the Papacy,
has -always been recognized by the Government of the
United States.
"The proposition, therefore, that the Church had no
corporate or jural personality seems to be completely answered by an examination of the law and history of the
Roman Empire, of Spain and of Porto Rico, down to the
time of the cession, and by the recognition accorded to it
as an ecclesiastical body by the Treaty of Paris and by
the law of nations. * * *
'Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church, 210 U. S. 96 (1908).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

"By the Spanish law, from the earliest moment of the
settlement of the Island to the present time, the corporate
existence of the Catholic Church has been recognized.
"The Roman Catholic Church has been recognized as
possessing legal personality by the Treaty of Paris and its
property rights similarly safe-guarded. In so doing, the
Treaty has merely followed the recognized rule of international law which would have protected the property of
the Church in Porto Pico subsequent to cession. This
juristic personality and the Church's ownership of property
had been recognized in the most formal way by the concordats between Spain and the Papacy and by Spanish laws
from the beginning of settlement in the Indies. Such recognition has also been accorded the Church by all systems
of European law from the Fourth Century of the Christian
Era.
"The fact that the municipality may have furnished
some funds for building and repairing the Churches cannot affect the title of the Roman Catholic Church, to whom
such funds were thus irrevocably donated and by whom
these temples were erected and dedicated to religious uses."
There is no doubt whatever that were such an amendment
attempted in the United States by any statute of our Federal
Congress or by any State by means of its Constitution or statutes,
such acts would immediately be declared unconstitutional and void
for it is not within the principles contained in American jurisprudence that such liberty and property could be confiscated without due process of law and denying at the same time equal protection of the law and deny juristic personality to the Churches is
clearly in violation of recognized rules of international law.
To seal the possibility of any loophole in the Constitution
there has been submitted to the Mexican Congress a still more
rigid Church bill which is to emphasize that the law no longer
recognizes any legal or juristic personality in religious groups and
that consequently Churches do not have any rights which the law
concedes to persons. Further, if Congress does not pass the bill,
President Calles has the power to promulgate it on his own account.
The Constitution of 1917, Article XXVII, subdivision 2, provides not only for the confiscation of the property of the Roman
Catholic Church as well as the property of all other churches, but
also that they:
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"shall in no case have any legal capacity to acquire, hold
or administer real property or loans made on such real
property."
By Article V it provides that
"states shall not permit any abridgement of personal liberty,
whether by reason of labor, education or religious vows
and does not permit the establishment of monastic orders
of whatever denomination or for whatever purpose contemplated."
By this Article the right to maintain -any sanitarium, charitable
institution to care for the blind, crippled, or people otherwise
incapacitated, or educational institution, is denied the Church.
The importance of religious liberty in connection with education must not be underestimated. To the Roman Catholic it is
deemed even more so, and is essential and inseparable. For many
centuries the education of children has been one of the principal
functions and activities of the Roman Catholic Church and irrespective of creed, critics, however hostile they may be, have conceded to the church an immeasurable debt for the preservation of
learning and of political and of other philosophies. Through the
Dark Ages, the Church, up to the time of the Reformation, may
well be regarded as a connecting link between the periods of learning in Europe.
Mr. Guthrie further points out that it is no exaggeration to
say that whatever culture and education exists to-day in Mexico,
is due primarily to teachers affiliated with the Roman Catholic
Church. To attempt to indict the Church for not further spreading their educational possibilities is not tenable when attention is
called to the sweeping confiscations of church property under the
Mexican Constitutions of 1857 and 1917. It is obviously unfair
and unreasonable to hold the Church responsible for not establishing more schools when its property and funds were being constantly confiscated or menaced with confiscation and with wholly
inadequate provisions made by successive governments.
In the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Lawton v.
Steel, 4 the Court said:
"The American people have always regarded education
and the acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme
'Lawton v. Steel, 152 U. S. 133. (1894)
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importance which should be diligently promoted. The Ordinance of 1787 declares,
'religion, morality and knowledge being necessary
to make good government and happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall ever after be
encouraged.'"
Following this, came the famous Oregon school cases-' in which
Mr. Justice MacReynolds delivered the unanimous decision of the
Court, saying: 6
"The inevitable practical result of enforcing the Act
under consideration would be the destruction of the appellees'
(the Catholic Sisters) primary schools, and perhaps all
other private primary schools for normal children within
the State of Oregon.
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S.
390 (1923) we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. As often heretofore pointed out,
rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged
by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some
provision within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose, excludes any general power of the State
to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The" child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
Article III of the Mexican Constitution of 1857 provided that
instruction should be free and under this guarantee the Roman
Church had been allowed to develop as far as it could possibly
do so in view of the confiscation of its property, without any
compensation or indemnity whatsoever, under Article XXIII of the
same Constitution. The Mexican Constitution of 1917 in one
breath declares that instruction shall be free and proceeds in the
next to absolutely deny any such liberty. By Article III it is said:
"Instruction is free; that given in public institutions
of learning shall be secular. Primary instruction, whether
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1924).
' Ibid. pp. 534, 535.
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higher or lower, given in private institutions shall likewise
be secular.
"No religious corporation nor ministers of any religious
creed shall establish or direct schools of primary instruction."
The first three words of this section were in the Constitution
of 1857, but the language following is added by the Constitution
of 1917. It is the aim of the Presidential decree of 1926 to absolutely enforce its constitutional provisions by oppressive sanctions
which are obviously intended to prevent parents from having their
children educated with any religious instruction whatsoever. A
cursory review of a few of these enactments are sufficient to establish the intent behind them.
Article III provides:
"That instruction that may be given in official educational establishments shall be secular; likewise, that given
in the higher or lower primary branches of private educational establishments.
"Article XII. For no reason shall confirmation be
made, exemption issued or any other procedure take place
that may have for its purpose the official validating of the
studies made in establishments destined for the professional
instruction of ministers of religion."
All of the aforementioned provisions have each a punishment
provided for in the form of imprisonment or fines and in some
cases both. It is not unreasonable to hold that such enactments
would be declared unjust and void and beyond the power of any
legislative body if enacted in any civilized countries throughout
the world. To say that under the Mexican Constitution of 1917
"instruction is free" is to jeer at the very meaning of the words
themselves.
Under Article CXXX
"The Federal authorities have the power to exercise in
matters of religious worship and outward ecclesiastical
forms such intervention as authorized by law, all other
officials shall act as auxiliaries to the Federal authorities.
"Ministers of religious creeds shall be considered as
persons exercising a purpose and shall be directly subject
to the laws enacted on the matter.
"The state legislature shall have the exclusive power
of determining the maximum number of ministers of reli-
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gious creeds, according to the needs of each locality. Only
a Mexican by birth may be a minister of any religious creed
in Mexico.
"No ministers of any religious creed may inherit, either
on his own behalf or by means of a trustee or otherwise,
any real property occupied by any association of religious
propaganda or religious or charitable purposes. Ministers
of religious creeds are incapable of legally inheriting by
will from ministers of the same religious creed or from
any private individual to whom they are not related by
blood within the fourth degree, all real and personal property appertaining to the clergy or to the religious institution shall be governed insofar as their acquisition by private
parties is concerned, in conformity vith Article XXVII of
this Constitution (confiscated).
"No trial by jury shall ever be granted for the enfraction of any of the preceding provisions."
Supplementing the above quoted provisions of the Constitution and the spirit that animated and brought about their adoption
and the decretal provisions of the Presidential bill of 1926, all of
these provisions have attached to them penalties ranging from a
small fine to a major arrest and deportation. Among these provisions are:
"Article I: To exercise the ministry of any cult within
the territory of a Mexican Republic, it is required to be
Mexican by birth."
"Article IV: No religious corporation or minister of
any cult shall be permitted to establish or direct schools
of primary instruction."
"Article VI: The state cannot permit that there be
carried into effect any contract, pact or agreement that may
have as an object the diminution, loss or irrevocable sacrifice of the liberty of man, whether it be for the reason of
work, education or religious vow; the law in consequence
does not permit the establishment of monastic orders, whatever may be the denomination or the object for which
they may seek to be established."
There follows a series of acts dealing primarily with restrictions
of the freedom of speech in the exercise of the ministry or priesthood of any religious cult.
"Article XVII provides: All religious acts of public
worship must be celebrated absolutely inside the Church,
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which shall always be under the supervision of the authorities."
"Article XVIII. Nor shall religious ministers or individuals of other sects belonging to such religion, be required to wear outside the Church special garments or
insignia that indicate their religion."
"Article XXI. The religious associations known as
Churches, whatever may be their creed, shall not have,
in any case, capacity for acquiring, possessing or administering real estate or real estate securities. Those who
actually do have such real estate, either in their own behalf
or through an intermediary agent shall turn it over to the
government of the nation, the right being granted to any
one to denounce property that may be found in such cases."
"Article XXII. The Churches destined for public
worship are the property of the nation, represented by the
Federal Government, which shall determine those Churches
which shall continue destined for the purpose of worship.
"Bishops' residences, parish houses, seminaries, asylums
or colleges of religious associations, convents or any other
buildings that may have been constructed or destined for
the administration, propaganda or teaching of any religious
belief, shall immediately pass, under law (de piano derecho)
to the full ownership of the nation, to be destined exclusively for the public use of the Federation or of the States
in their respective jurisdictions."
The confiscations of the property of the Roman Catholic
Church by the Mexican Constitution of 1917 merely supplemented
such confiscatory measures made under the Constitution of 1857
and by the Mexican Government and other measures both by the
Mexican Republic and the Government of Spain before the Independence of Mexico, under Article XVII of the present Constitution, it is provided that
"private property shall not be expropriated except for
reasons of public utility and by means of indemnification.
"(a) The religious institution known as Churches, irrespective of creed, shall in no case have legal capacity to
acquire, hold or administer real property or loans made on
such real property; all such real property or loans as may
be at present held by such religious institutions, either in
their own behalf or through third parties, shall vest in the
nation and any one shall have the right to denounce prop-
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erty so held. Presumptive proof shall be sufficient to
declare the denunciation well founded. Places of public
worship are property of the nation, as represented by the
Federal Government, which shall determine which of them
may continue to be devoted to their present purposes. Episcopal residences, rectories, seminaries, orphan asylums or
collegiate establishments of religious institutions, convents or
any other buildings built or designed for the administering,
propaganda or teaching of the tenets of any religious
creed shall forthwith vest as of full right, directly in the
nation, to be used exclusively for the public services of
the Federation or of the States within their jurisdictions.
All places of public worship which shall later be enacted
shall be the property of the nation.
"(3)

*

*

*

In

no case shall institutions of this

character be under the patronage, direction, administration,
charge or supervision of religious corporations or institutions, nor ministers of any religious creed or of their dependence, even though either the former or the latter shall not
be in active service."
It is obvious that although the Mexican Constitution expressly provides against expropriation without indemnification by
the above .quoted Article, discrimination is made againsf religious
institutions providing for such expropriation without- any indemnity or compensation whatsoever. It is manifest that under the
principles of American liberty and the principles recognized by the
laws of nations that such expropriation without indemnification is
void and would be readily condemned. This view is voiced in the
United States Supreme Court by the learned and revered Mr.
7
Justice Storey. In the leading case of Terrett v. Taylor,
"Be, however, the general authority of the legislature
as to the subject of religion, as it may, it will require
other arguments to establish the position with which at the
revolution all the public property acquired by the Episcopal
Churches under the sanction of the law became the property of the State. Had the property thus acquired been
originally granted by the State or King there might have
been some color (and it would have been but a color) for
such an extraordinary pretension. But the property was, in
fact and in law, generally purchased by the parishioners or
acquired by the benefactions of pious donors. The title
1

Terret v. Taylor, 9 Cranch (U. S.) 43 (1815).
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thereto was indefeasibly vested in the churches, or rather
in their legal agents. It was not in the power of the Crown
to seize or assume it, nor the Parliament itself to destroy
the grants, unless by the exercise of a power the most
arbitrary, oppressive and unjust, and endured only because
it could not be resisted. * * * Nor are we able to perceive any sound ieason why the church lands escheated
or devolved upon the State by the revolution any more than
the property of any other corporation created by royal
bounty or established by the legislature."
This doctrine has been repeatedly quoted and adhered to, to
date. It is unnecessary to quote any further authorities to sustain
the proposition that the property of no church may be taken by
the Nation or State without just indemnification or compensation.
Such just compensation is guaranteed to all religious corporations
by the Constitution of the United States. (Fifth Article and by
the Fourteenth Amendment which is an express restraint of confiscatory action by any State.)
The propriety of intervention is a matter which has long since
been accepted in International law. However, the grounds for
intervention have been the cause of much dissension and "it must
be recognized that the ground of humanity is the most delicate of
the causes which may be" expected to justify the right of intervention, and it raises juridical difficulties in regard to the basis
and extent of this right."
While it is true that certain publicists 8 have looked askance
upon interventions on this ground and in some cases have denied
its legality, the general weight of authority proclaims that it is
within the duties of a civilized nation to intervene to uphold the
law of nations. The premise from which these objections to inter' Bernard, On the Principle of Non-Intervention (1860) ; Berner, Intervention, 5 Deutsches Staats-Woerterbuch of Bluntschli (1860) p. 341; Carnozzi Amori, 5 Revue du Droit International (1873) pp. 352, 531; Cimbali,
It Non-Intervento (1862) p. 261, "II non intervento, dunque, che constituise
la pifi perfetta e scrupolasa quarentegia della indipendenza nazionale dei
populi 6 un diretto assoluto inviolabile"; Herv6, Intervention, 2 Block's
Dictionnaire gin6rale de la politique (1874); Maxey, International Law
(1906) p. 341; 3 Mill Dissertations and Discussions (1861) p. 153; Rotteck,
Das Recht der Einmeschung in die inneren Angelenheiten (1854) pp. 10,
16, 20-25, 47; Werdenhagen, Synopsis in sex libros (1645); 2 Vattel, Law
of Nations (1916) sec. 54, p. 131 cf. sec. 56 p. 131; Stowell, Intervention
in International Law (1921) n.p. 52 collates those who oppose humanitarian
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vention start is the Vattel, 9 "Foreign nations have no right to
interfere in the government of an independent State." Intervention is prima facie a hostile act inasmuch as it constitutes an
attack upon the independence of the sovereignty. It is assumed
that a nation does not undertake the possibilities of an extensive
war with an entirely altruistic motive in* mind. The claim as set
forth by Vattel on its surface seems a distinct enough doctrine,
but, unfortunately, its realization presupposes the existence of an
ideal world. While it is not improbable that a nation might sit by
and never intercede in behalf of another nation or subjects of that
nation, such, an attitude could not be taken in good conscience,
"for intervention must result not only from mutual aggression but
from the natural impulses to mutual aid." It becomes more and
more apparent that the intervention which these publicists deny is
intervention but Stowell himself favors its propriety with the weight of

authority to the same effect. Rougier, 17 Revue Generale du droit International Public (1910) p. 472.
La theorie de l'intervention d'humanit6 est proprement celle que reconnait pour un droit l'exercice du contr6le international d'un Atat sur les

actes de souverainet6 int~rieure d'un autre Atat contraries "aux lois de
l'humanit6", et qui pr6tend en organiser juridiquement le fonctionnement.
Suivant cette doctrine, chaque fois que las droits humains d'un peuple seraient
m~connus par ses gouvernants, un au plusiers P-tats pourraient intervenir
au nom de la Soci~t6 des nations, soit pour demander l'annulation des actes
de puissance publique critiquables, soit pour empcher A l'avenir le renou-

vellement de tels actes, soit pour suppli6r i l'inaction du gouvernment
en prenant des mesures conservatoires urgentes, et en substituant momen-

tan~ment leur souverainet6 A celle de 1' Atat contr616. To the same effect

is Arntz, 8 Revue du Droit International (1816) p. 675; Bluntschli, V6lkerrecht (1868); Creasy First Platform of International Law (1876) Chap.
IX; 2 Grotius, De Juri Belli et Pacis, Chap. 25, sec. 8; 2 Gunther, Europaisches V61kerrecht (1792) pp. 333-335, however, does not justify the
use of force; Hall, International Law (4th ed. 1895) p. 57, cf. (8th ed.
1924) p. 342; Halleck, International Law (1861) pp. 81-97, 289-334; Martens,
Precis (1821) p. 211; Moore, Digest of International Law (1906) vols.
V, VI; Moser, Versuch des Deutschen Europaischen V61kerrechts (1770-

1780) p. 184; 1 Oppenheim, International Law (3rd ed. 1920) p. 229; 1

Phillimore, Commentaries on International Law (3rd ed. 1879) p. 622; 1
Westlake, International Law (1910) p. 391; Wheaton, International Law

(5th ed. 1915) p. 104; Wilson, International Law (1910) p. 64; Wilson and
Tucker, International Law (8th ed. 1922) p. 91; Woolsey, International Law
(6th ed. 1891) p. 58.
'2 Vattel, Law of Nations sec. 54, p. 131. "C'est une cons6quence manifeste de la Libert6 et de l'ind~pendance des Nations, qui toutes sont en droit

de se gouvernur comme elles le jugent A propos, et qu'ausune n'a le moindre
droit de se miler du Gouvernement d'une autre."
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improper intervention and by the weight of authority since the
very beginning of International Law, the propriety of intervention
in many cases has been recognized as valid. If we are to regard
law upon any hypothesis which results in the isolation of separate
states, international rights and duties would thus equally cease
and international law would lose the object of its existence. If we
are to regard law as bounded within the frontiers of each individual state, then between these frontiers Hobbes' terrible conception of universal war would be realized.
The prevalent opinion as to the validity and grounds for
intervention are well expressed in the following two quotations by
Hall and Westlake:
"When a State grossly and patently violates internaticnal law in a manner of serious importance, it is competent to another state or to the body of states to hinder the
wrong doing from being accomplished or to punish the
wrong doer. Whatever may be the action appropriate to
the case it is open to every state to take it. International
law being unprovided with the support of an organized
authority the work of police must be done by such members
of the community of nations as are able to perform it.""1o

"The moral effect of misrule on the neighboring police
is to be taken into account. Where these include considerable numbers allied by religion, language or race to the
populace suffering from misrule, to refrain the former from
giving support to the latter in violation of the legal rights
of the misruled state may be a task beyond the power of
their government, or requiring it to resort to modes of
its subjects, and not necessary for their good order if they
were not excited by the spectacle of miseries which they
must feel acutely. It is idle to argue in such a case that
the duty of the neighboring peoples is to look on quietly.
Laws are made for man and not for creatures of situations
which are beyond the endurance, we will not say of average human nature since laws may fairly expect to raise
the standard by their operation, but of the best human
nature that at the time and place they can hope to meet
with."

"

'0Hall, International Law (4th ed. 1895) p. 57. In a later work Hall
seeks a ground upon which to rest the right of humanitarian intervention.
8th ed. 1924, p. 342.
' 1 Westlake, International Law (1910) p. 391.
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There is ample precedent throughout the history of the world
for intervention on humanitarian grounds. Grotius recognizes this
in his famed work "De Jure et Pacis" where he quotes:
"But rather as Procopius has it, 'it is more agreeable
to the rules of equity that every man should carefully gov-.
er his own province and not trouble himself with the
affairs of others' yet are all these to be understood in such
cases where another man's subjects have manifestly offended
or at least whereof is doubtful whether they have or not,
for to this end were empires first distributed: but they
do not hold in case subjects apparently grown in such
tyrannies _as no just man can approve of; and therefore,
are precluded from those rights that are common to human
society. For in such a case as this it was that Constantine
made war against Maxentius and Licentius; aInd other
Roman emperors against the Persians, or threatened to
do so unless they protect from oppression such of their
subjects as were Christians, being persecuted for no other
cause but that of religion." 12
In the Sixteenth Century we find continued requests for
intervention "* * * in behalf of neighboring peoples who are
oppressed of adherence to true religion or by any obvious
tyranny." Is
It would be impossible to attempt to review completely the
long series of interventions based on humanitarian grounds and
religious persecution. In the age which succeeded the Reformation, both self-preservation and religious sympathies induced Protestant states to aid one another against the superior might of the
Catholic, and to aid the votaries of their faith within Catholic
countries, in order to secure for them freedom of worship. Elizabeth of England sent aid to the revolted Hollanders on religious
grounds, 14 and Cromwell's threats slackened the persecution of the
Waldenses by the Duke of Savoy.15
Sweden interfered in 1707 on behalf of the Protestants in
"2 Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, chap. 25, sec. 8, Evats Translation
(1682) p. 425.
" Vindicae contra tyrannos (1579).
'4Woolsey, International Law (6th ed. 1891) p. 58; 1 Phillimore, Commentaries on International Law (3rd ed. 1879) p. 622.
11Ibid.
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Poland,'

6

and the Treaties of Velau, 1657,7 of Oliva, 1660,'" of

21
Nimeguan, 1679,19 of Ryswick, 1698,20 of Utrecht, 1713,

of

Breslau, 1742,22 may all be enumerated as instances of Roman
Catholic intervention on behalf of Roman Catholic subjects in
countries ceded to Protestant sovereigns.
In modem times the noteworthy examples of intervention
avowedly dictated by motives of humanity, are the interceding by
Great Britain, France and Russia in behalf of the Greeks in 1827.
At that time these governments suggested mediation which the

Greeks accepted but which the Turks rejected and accordingly instructions were given to the commanders of the allied squadrons to
compel cessation of hostilities. This intercession by these three

great powers is justifiable not only from the standpoint of religious
persecution of the Greeks but from the cruel alternative given
them of being transported from their native land or exterminated
by their merciless oppressors. It is still more justifiable to vindicate the rights of human nature wantonly outraged by cruel warfare, prosecuted for six years against a civilized and Christian
people.
There have been several other instances where insurrections
have led other European states to interfere between the Porte and
its subjects, either on the ground that the Porte would not redress
the wrongs of which the insurgents justly complained, or that the
treatment of the Christians by the Mohammedans was of such a
nature as could not be tolerated. Of this interference Wheaton
says: "So long as force was not used to coerce the government
of the Sultan they may be justified in international law." 23 In
1877 Russia intervened in the Porte because of religious persecution and by virtue of her protectorate over the Greek Church.24
Another example'

5

typical of humanitarian

intervention to

"1 Phillimore, supra note 14.
"Article XVI.
' Article II.
"Article IX.
'o Article IV.
Article XXIII.
'Article VI.
' Protectorate first claimed by virtue of Treaty of Nynardgi (1774)
art. VII, VIII, XIX in 1854 by Count Nesserolde and is basis for Treaty
of Berlin in June 19, 1878.
21 Wheaton, International Law (5th ed. 1916)
p. 107.
'Stowell, Intervention in International Law (1921) p. 63.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

prevent religious persecution is the French occupation of Syria
from August, 1860, to -June, 1861, after brutal massacre of Christian maronites without any efforts on the part of the Porte to
fulfill its obligation to protect the victims.
Moser 26 gives as an illustration of intercession the representations addressed by the British and Netherland governments to
Marie Theresa which may be regarded as an intervention in favor
of the Jews in Prague. The oppression of the Jews and the many
instances of outrages their persecution has brought about, lists
a series of remarkable interventions in their favor. In Roumania in 1867 the British representative was instructed to interpose diplomatically in their favor.2 7 The French consulate at
Jassy received instructions from Paris to take "prompt and energetic steps to put a stop to an iniquity which is a dishonor to the
Roumanian government." s28 In 1872 29 the Secretary of State of
the United States addressed a note authorizing the American Consul at Bucharest to do anything which may be done with a reasonable prospect of success toward preventing a recurrence or continuance of the persecution adverted to, and a month later approved of the action of the American Consul in joining in a
remonstrance addressed by the representatives of the foreign
powers at Bucharest against the maltreatment of the Israelites.
Again, in 1902,30 Secretary Hay called attention of the powers to
Roumania's violation of the Treaty of Berlin and her unjustifiable
oppression of the Jews and, as Rougier 2 ' pointed out, that while
this note was based upon Article XX of the Berlin Treaty, it is
in reality an exposition of humanitarian intervention.
In Russia, also, the Jews have frequently been subjected to
outrages from the populace without interference on the part of the
Rusian government. Stirred by these barbarous acts, the United
States diplomatically intervened to the extent of making representations against the treatment of the Jews, and used these diplomatic influences in favor of toleration. 2 Finally, public opinion in
'Moser-Versuch

des neuesten europ1iischen V61kerrechts (1778) p. 96.

'74 Parliamentary papers (1867) p. 3890;,62 British and Foreign State
Papers (1877) p. 705.

2Ibid.
'6 Moore, Digest of International Law (1906) p. 360.
'Ibid, p. 365.
Rougier, supra note 8 p. 515.
"Foreign Relations (1880) p. 873; Foreign Relations (1882)
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America became so thoroughly aroused that on December 17, 1911,
the American Ambassador officially notified the Russian government of the termination of the Treaty of 1832. In a previous
interview with Mr. Sazanoff the American Ambassador explained
the American view-point in regard to the contemplated abrogation of the Treaty and said that the action of the House of Representatives "was unquestionably influenced by a sincere conviction that such action might have far-reaching results in inducing
Russia to abandon not only the restrictions on foreign Jews but the
restriction of her own Jews." 33
Turkey's persecution of the Armenians has been another
ground for a series of continued interventions culminating in the
report published in the New York Evening Post to the effect that
"the Turkish government will be formally notified that unless the
massacres of Armenians cease, friendly relations between American people and the people of Turkey will be threatened." 3- This
action is of special interest since it took place at a critical moment
of the war when intervention might well have had the most
serious consequences for the Turkish government and those responsible for the persecutions perpetrated upon the defenceless
Armenians. It is significant to note that the United States has
already interposed in favor of the Roman Catholic bishops upon
the attempted confiscation of a fund known as the Pious Fund of
California. This fund had had a separate existence recognized
by the several governments of Mexico for a period of well over
a century and a half. This intervention brought about the attention of the Hague Peace Tribunal and subsequently an award was
made of this fund by that body.3"
It is not within the province of this article to determine the
wisdom of intervention in Mexico. This problem is extremely
delicate and complex, and many questions of policy arise which
are beyond the scope of this paper.
The development of International law depends upon a crystallization of its precedents and we believe it is imperative to point
out that the history of the Law of Nations confers the right and
duty upon any civilized nation to intervene on humanitarian
grounds and to prevent religious persecution. It is generally con'

Foreign Relations (1911) pp. 695-699.
New York Evening Post, Oct. 5, 1915.
Wilson, Hague Arbitration Cases (1915) p. 1.
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sidered that the U. S. exercises a certain hegemony on the American continent and when such persecution and oppression occur in
the new world it is well to keep in mind an excerpt from the
immortal American Theodore Roosevelt's annual message:
"Brutal wrongdoing, or impotence which results in the general loosening of the ties of civilized society may finally require
intervention by more civilized nations, and in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore its duty." 86
MuRRY HARSTN.

New York City.
"° Annual Message,
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